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HEALTh INSURANCE AND THE
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ABSTRACT
Some commentators have suggested that the absence of portable health insurance impedes
people from leaving their jobs to start new finns. We investigate this belief by comparing wage-
earners who become self-employed during a given period of time with their counterparts who do
not. By examining the impact of variables relating to the health insurance and health status of
these workers and theft families, we can infer whether the lack of health insurance portability
affects the probability that they become self-employed. The evidence does not support the
conjecture that the current health insurance system affects the propensity to become self-
employed. Hence, whatever its other merits, there is no reason to believe that the introduction
of universalhealth insurancewould significantly enhance entrepreneurial activity.
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and NBER1f you leave your job to start a
smallbusiness, you're covered"
—PresidentBill Clinton.
on the advantages of his
Health Securityplan.'
1. INTRODUCTION
Most medical insurance in the United States is provided by employers. Two out of
every three Americans under the age of 65 are covered by employer-provided insurance,and
these individuals constitute roughly 75 percent of all employees (Aaron [1991]). Employer-
provided insurance is typically not portable. As a result, people who switch jobs may lose
their health insurance, a situation that may reduce labor market mobility •2Thoughtful
observers of the U.S. health insurance system have long recognized the potential importance
of this job-Iock" phenomenon. Several recent studies are consistent with this view. For
example, Madrian [19941 claims that job-lock reduces labor force mobility by 25 percent.
In the same vein, some have conjectured that the absence of portable insurance may
affectthedecision to leave a job and start a new firm. Thus, the Wall Street Journal noted,
"If you're thinking of taking the entrepreneurial plunge, take a break from the business plans
and five-year projections, and consider your family's need for health, disability and life
insurance" (Asinof [1992]). This view was articulated more carefully by Laura D'Andrea
Tyson, Chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisers: "The difficulty of self-employed
workers and small businesses today in purchasing health insurance creates large disincentives
for individuals to leave covered jobs to start up new businesses. Reform may thus stimulate
new business formation, particularly for small businesses. There is little economic research
on this subject to date. "
—1—In fact, we know of 112 research on the question of whether the largely employer-
based health insurance system in the United States has reduced the supply of entrepreneurs.
The goal of this paper is to provide some evidence on this important issue.
Our basic approach involves comparing wage-earners who make a transition to self-
employment over a given period of time with their counterparts who do not. By examining
the impact of variables relating to the health insurance and health status of these workers and
their families, we can make inferences about whether the lack of health. insurance portability
affects the probability that they choose to become self-employed.
While no previous research has addressed this issue, there has been some related
work, and it is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the model that we employ to
organize our analysis of the data. Section 4 describes the data. We ethploy two sources, the
Survey of Program Participation (SIP?) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
We focus primarily on the SIPP data, because they are particularly suitable for analyzing our
problem. However, to reduce the likelihood that our results are an artifact of this data
source, we check the robustness of our conclusions using the PSID. The results are
presented in Section 5. Surprisingly, we find that in the overwhelming majority of cases,
health insurance portability has no impact on transitions from wage-earning to
entrepreneurship. In Section 6 we conclude with a summary and suggestions for future
research.
-2-2. PRIOR UTERATURE
Two strands of pi.vious research are especially relevant to our problem. The first is
the empirical literature examining transitions from wage-earning into entrepreneurship. It
has focused on issueslikethe effects of race, gender, occupation, and access to capital
markets. Examples of such work are provided by Evans and Leighton [1989], Holtz-Eakin,
Joulfaian and Rosen [1994] and Meyer [1990]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there have been no attempts at all to link health insurance institutions to the supply of
entrepreneurs.
The second strand relates to the growing concern that, because health insurance is
generally provided by a person's employer, leaving one job to take another mayentail the
loss of health insurance and reduce job mobility.4 Indeed, even if a worker is able to obtain
insurance on a new job. pre-existing condition exclusions, medical underwriting, and term-
of-service limitations may make health insurance provided by a current employer more
valuable to a worker than an otherwise comparable policy offered by a prospective
employer.5 The result in all these cases is the same —thelack of portable health insurance
may impose costs that impede mobility from one job to another. (SeeCongressional Budget
Office [1992, pp. 7, 9].)
Economists have now begun to seek statistical evidence for the existence of this job-
lock phenomenon. Cooper and Monheit [forthcoming] use data from the National Medical
Expenditure Survey (NMES) to examine whether the probability of making a job-to-job
transition is affected by the presence of employer-provided health insurance. They find that
there is a statistically significant negative correlation, which is consistent with the presence of
job-lock. However, Holtz-Ealdn [1994] and Madrian (1994] have pointed out a potential
-3-problem with this approach. Because it is impossible for the researcher to obtain
comprehensive information about an individual's work environment, the presence of
employer-provided health insurance may simply be a proxy for the presence of various
unobservedcharacteristicsof the job. That is, "good jobs" may provide a package of
desirablecharacteristicsincludinghealthinsurance (which appears inthedata)andother
characteristics (which donot).Hence,the fact that workers are less likely to leave jobs with
health insurance may cell usnothing more thanpeoplehangonto "good jabs."
Todeal with this problem, both Holtz-Eaidn and Madrian employ a "differences-
within-differences" approach. Rather than compare those with employer-provided insurance
to those without it, they look within the group of people who have such insurance, and ask
whether differences in expected insurance costs affect job-to-job transitions. Using this
approach, Holtz-Eakin finds no evidence of job-lock in the PSID. Madrian's results, based
on the NMES, are suggestive of job-lock, but the statistical significance of the relevant
parameter estimates is relatively low. In any case, neither study examines job-to-
entrepreneurship transitions.
As in the job-to-job transitions that are the subject of the above smdies, transitions to
self-employment from the wage-and-salary sector include the costs associated with the
termination of one health insurance policy and the opening of another. However, transitions
to self-employment involve two additional considerations that do not apply to job-to-job
transitions. First, health insurance benefits for wage and salary workers are not taxable
while only 25 percent of health insurance costs for the self-employed are deductible.6
Second, for reasons of market power, adverse selection or administrative costs, for
-4-comparable plans and benefits, health insurance costs are 10 to 40 percent higher for small
businesses .
Torecap, transitions to self-employment from the wage-and-salary sector entail even
higher costs than transitions between employers within the wage-and-salary sector because of
the higher premia and less favorable tax treatment of those premia in the self-employment
sector. Seven! proposals have been made to reduce the costs of such transitions. For
example, various parties have urged the Congress and the Administration to enact legislation
that would allow self-employed individuals to deduct the full value of their health insurance
premiums to avoid "putting small businesses out of business."
Manyof the proposals for
health insurance reform contain elements intended to lower the cost of health insurance to
small firms. Most of these proposals rely on government-encouraged risk-pooling
arrangements for small businesses and others that would increase the power of the this group
in the market for health insurance, thereby lowering their cost of coverage. A premise of
such policies is that lowering the costs of making a transition to entrepreneurship would
increase the supply of entrepreneurs. However, the existence and magnitude of the response
is ultimately an empirical question.9
3. THE MODEL
In the simplest case, let the probability of making the transition to entrepreneurship be
given by'°
p(entrepreneur)=•(z)+a1d1 + a2d2 + cr3d3+cx4d4, (1)
where z is a vector of non-insurance variables that affect the propensity to become an
entrcprcneur; d1isa dichotomous variable equal to one if the individual is the only person in
-5-the household to have insurance andequal to zerootherwise; d2 is defined similarly and
indicates that only the individual's spouse has insurance; d3equalsone if both the individual
and the spouse are insured; t14 indicates that neither has insurance; and the a's are
parameters. (For purposes of exposition, assume that the spouse's insurance policy provides
coverage for the individual.) If the lack of portable insurance impedes transitions to
entrepreneurship, then individuals whose employment and insurance are tied should have a
lower probability of making a transition, ceteris paribus. In terms of equation (1), this
corresponds to having d,=1.Whenever d1=0,an individual's access to insurance is
independent of his or her wage-earning employment. For example, if ct2 =1,then the
individual is covered by the spouse's policy, which provides coverage whether or not there is
a transition to entrepreneurship. Or if d4=1,the individual has no job-related insurance to
lose, and it is therefore not a factor when starting a new business.
Following Holtz-Eakin [1994] and Madrian itturns out to be useful to express
equation (1) in a slightly different form:
p(entrepreneur)=(z)+ fl1S'ef+fl2Spousefl3Both, (2)
where Self indicates that the individual has employer-provided insurance,Spouseindicates
that the spouse has insurance, and Both is the interaction(product) of these two variables. A
bit of algebra reveals the correspondence between equations (1) and (2):
p(entrepreneur)=(z) +
+fl1)dt+(fib+Ø2)d2(0o fi2 ÷fl3)d3+ fl0d4. (3)
Considernow equation (1). As argued above, the discouraging effect of the potential
loss of health insurance comes into playonly when d1 1. Note that the other possibilities
are equivalent from the perspective of health insurance —theindividual loses no insurance if
-6-he or she leaves the job. Hence, one would expect a2 =a3 = a4.Thus, the notion that
lack of portability affects transitions amounts to testing the null hypothesis that
a1 =a2(.a3=a4). Thishypothesis has several implications for the parameters in equation
(3): (i) a2 =a3implies that+03 =0;(ii) a3 =a4implies that /31+02+133 =0,so that
these together require that $2 =0;and (iii) a1 =a2implies that $= sothat j3 must
also be zero. Collecting results, this requires that $3, the coefficient on the interaction
variable (Both) be zero. Thus, the model suggests the (not surprising) result that one should
test whether all of the coefficients on the insurance variables in (2) are equal to zero. If they
are, this is consistent with the notion that health insurance has no effect on transitions to
entrepreneurship. On the other hand, rejection of this null hypothesis is consistent with the
notion that lack of health insurance portability restricts the supply of new entrepreneurs.
However, as stressed above, one could argue that the presence of an employer-
provided plan is really serving as an indicator of whether the individual has a good job." If
so, all that finding a1 C 0 establishes is that people are less likely to leave "good jobs" than
bad jobs," a result that tells us little about the importance of the insurance portability issue.
However, we can use information on the spouse's insurance status to deal with this problem.
To see how, considcr two individuals, both of whom have employer-provided plans, and only
one of whom has a spouse with insurance coverage. To the extent that insurance portability
is a consideration in starling a new firm, then an individual who could be covered by the
spouse's policies should be more likely to make a transition to entrepreneurship, ceteris
paribus. Moreover,if the spouse has insurance coverage, then the impact should be greater
for those with higher expected health care expenses. In short, looking at differences within
-7-the group of people who have employer-provided plans should provide a much more
convincing test.
In terms of equation (1). the "good jobs" argument essentially says that does not
control completely for attributes of the job that are correlated with the presence of insurance.
It is likely, then, that the coefficients on d1 and d3 are contaminated by these job-related
attributes. In the same way, one could imagine a scenario in which t2= 1reflects the fact
that the spouse has skills sufficient to command a good job, skills that also make it easier for
the individual to become an entrepreneur independent of insurance considerations. Thus the
coefficients on ciaandd3 would be contaminated in a similar fashion by the spouse's




p(entrepreneur)= '4(z) + 71d1+ + + 74d4, (4)
wherejisthe contamination due to incomplete characterization of the individual's job and s
isthe corresponding contamination due to spouse-effects. Because of thepresence of sandj.
it is not possible to use estimates of the coefficients in (4) to test the relevanthypotheses
regarding the coefficients in equation (1). Indeed, one cannot even learn about health
insurance effects by looking at (la-li). (73-Il). or(74-71)'becauseeach contains either sor
j.However,comparing the "differences of the differences," allows us to eliminate the
various unobserved attributes.Algebraically, (73-72)-(7l-74) =(a3-a2)-(cr1-a),which
does not depend on sorj.Under the null hypothesis, this should equai zero. Returning to
equation (3), it is straightforward to verify that (cr3-a2)-(cr1-a4) =fl3. Thus,testing the null
hypothesis in the presence of job-effects and spouse-effects involvestesting whether the
-8-coefficient on the interaction variable differs from zero. Intuitively, if health insurance has
no effect on transitions, the impact of having an employer-provided plan should not depend
on whether the worker can be covered by a spouse's plan.
It might be possible that whether the spouse has insurance is itself endogenous to the
transition —onespouse might obtain insurance in anticipation of the other becoming self-
employed. As discussed below, in addition to information on the health insurance available
to individuals, our data contain self-reported measures of the health status of individuals as
well as other variables that might measure expected future health care costs. Such variables
can also be used to compute another type of differences in differences estimator. For
example, individuals who are in poor health should put a higher value on having insurance,
ceterisparibus. Hence,within the group of people who have employer-provided plans, we
expect those who are in poor health and lack portable coverage (e.g., through their spouse)
to be less likely to make the transition to entrepreneurship.
Our discussion so far has ignored the role, of laws that relate to health insurance
portability. In 1985. the United States Congress passed the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA), which contained provisions whose purpose was to ease the
problem of job-lock. Essentially, COBRA mandated that when an employee leaves a firm
for any reason other than gross misconduct, he or she must be allowed the opportunity to
purchase he.alth insurance from the firm for up to 18 months. (See Flynn [1992].) COBRA
did not go into effect until after our sample period. However, prior to 1985 a number of
states passed their own COBRA-like statutes. This provides a "natural experiment" that can
be used to help us assess whether lack of portability affects entrepreneurship. Our data
provide infonnation on the individual's state of residence. Hence, we can determinewhether
-9-each individual had the option to purchase health insurance after separating from his job, and
whether this influenced the probability of making a transition to entrepreneurslijp.
4. DATA
We use both the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The SIP? data contain a richer set of variables relating
to insurance status and health. Hence, we rely primarily on the SIPP data, and use the PSID
mainly to confirm certain of the results.
4.1 SIPP Data
In the SIPP data, we focus on transitions to self-employment between 1984 and 1986,
which correspond to waves 3 arid 912• To be in our sample, individuals must be between
16 and 62 years of age, and not be employed in the agricultural sector)3 Selecting on
these criteria left us with 21.467 observations in wave 3. Individuals were classified as
being wage-earners or self-employed according to the mode in which they spent the most
hours. This gave us 2.078 self-employed people, about 9.7percent of the total, a figure
quite close to that found in other studies of the incidence of self-employment. Alternatively,
one might classifS' an individual as being self-employs only if he or she has nowage-
employment at all. This alternative definition leads to substantially the same results as those
reported below. 14
The SIP? data contain a rich set of variables relating to the economic and
demographic status of the individuals (corresponding to the z vector in equation 1). Table
4.1 shows the means of these variables inwave 3 for both employed (column (1)) and self-
employed (column (2)) individuals. The table also provides thesame information for the
-10-variables relating to health and insurance status. Inter alia, the table suggests that the self-
employed are on avenge older, better educated, and more likely to be white and male than
wage earners, fmdings that echo earlier studies. (See, e.g., Meyer [19901.)More
interesting for our purposes are the comparisons with respect to health and insurance status
toward the bottom of the table. The health status of self-employed individuals and their
families does not appear to differ markedly from that of their wage earner counterparts. For
example, 69.7 percent of the wage-earners characterize their health as "excellent' or "good;'
the figure for the self-employed is 68.9 percent. For our purposes, perhaps the most stiking
result to emerge from Table 4.1 is that the self-employed are much more likely to lack health
insurance than wage and salary workers —17.9percent of the self-employed.have no
coverage, versus 10.4 percent of wage and salaryworkers)5
Although our emphasis is on transition issues, it is of some interest to.explore a bit
further this cross-sectional difference in the propensity to lack insurance. Is it a consequence
of correlations between various socioeconomic variables and self-employment status •ordoes
employment status have an independent effect, even after taking other variables into account?
To investigate this issue, we estimated a simple linear probability model in which the left-
hand side variable takes a value of one if the individual lacks insurance and zero otherwise.
The right-hand side variables include a set of economic and demographic variables as well as
a dichotomous variable SELF, which equals one if the individual is self-employedand zero
otherwise. The results are reported in Table 4.2. The coefficient on SELF is 0.0883
(s.c. =0.00717),indicating that self-employment raises the probability of being uninsured
by 8.8 percentage points, which actually exceeds the 7.4 percentage point rawdifference
—11—from Table 4. 1. Thus, the difference in the insurance rates does not appear to be due to the
correlation between self-employment and the individual's characteristics. t6
Returningnow to Table 4.1. columns (3) and (4) examine the 1986 employment status
of individuals who were wage and salary workers in 1984.17 Column (3) shows the 1984
values of variables for individuals who stayed wage and salary workers in 1986, and column
(4) shows the same variables for those who made a transition to self-employment.
Individuals who were white, not in a union, and with relatively short job tenures were more
likely to make a transition to self-employment.'8 On the other hand, there appear to be no
systematic differences in the health status of those who make a transition to self-employment
and those who do not. Those who were not covered by any insurance in 1984 were more
likely to make a transition to self-employment, as were those whose spouses were covered by
an employer-provided plan. These tabulations seem consistent with the notion that lack of
insurance portability does have an impact —thosewith no plan or a spouse with a plan (and
hence, "nothing to lose") are more likely to become entrepreneurs. Indeed, the transition
rate for those with an employer-provided plan (0.0209, s.d. =0.143)is significantly less
than that for those without such a plan (0.0326, s.d. =0.178).
19Ofcourse, a multivariate
analysis of the kind described above is required to make more definitive statements. In this
context, one should remember the importance of finding "differences in differences" before
ascribing significant effects to health insurance.
4.2 PSIDData
As noted earlier, we employ data from the P5W to as check on the robustness of our
results. Like the SIPP, the PSID contains a rich array of the demographic and economic
variables.Unlikethe SIPP, however, the information concerning health insurance
-12-arrangements is quite limited. In the 1984 wave of the PSID. individuals (and their spouses)
were asked the question:
"Does your employer pay for any medical, surgical, or hospital insurance that
coven any illness or injury that might happen to you when you are not at
work?"
We classil5' those individuals who answered "yes" as having employer-provided health
insurance, and similarly for spouses of married individuals. Also, we proceed under the
assumption that individuals are eligible for coverage under their spouse's plan, if present.2°
With respect to health status, the PSIDincludestwo self-assessment measures. In the
first, individuals rated their health in 1984. We classified those responding 'good," "very
good," or "excellent" as being in good health. Roughly 64 percent of the sample falls in this
classification, quite close to the value in the SIPP data. The second self-assessment question
asked individuals to rate their health in 1984 versus that in 1982; we use these responses to
identifS' those individuals who are in "worse" health. In addition, the PSID provides
information on nights spent in the hospital by each individual (and his or her spouse, if
married) during 1984 and hours of work lost by each individual (and, by spouses, where
appropriate) due to illness.
Sample statistics for those individuals who were wage and salary workers (and thus
form the sample for our multivariate analysis) are shown in Table 4.3.
-13-4.3 The Mandate Data
As noted above, during our sample period several states imposed mandates that
required employers to allow employees to purchase health insurance from them for a certain
period of time after the employees were separated from the firm. The sources of the
mandate data were Hewitt Associates [1986], Gruber [1992], and, in some cases, the state
statutes themselves. Seventeen states had continuation mandates that covered voluntary
separations and became effective during 1984 or before. The length of eligibility was
typically less than the 1 8-month continuation subsequently mandated by the federal COBRA
law; the length of eligibility varied from 1.5 to 18 months.2'
In wave 3 of the 1984 SIPP panel, 28 percent of wage and salary workers lived in
states mandating continuing coverage. Of those that lived in covered states, the avenge
length of mandated coverage was 6.7 months.
5. RESULTS
5.1 Results from the SIPP
The Baseline Saxnnle. Our baseline sample consists of the entire group of wage-
earners in 1984 for whom we can make matches in 1986. provided that they were either
employed or self-employed in 1986. This is a rather heterogeneous sample, so to assess the
robustness of our results we also estimated the model for various sub-samples. At the outset.
we estimated a logit model of the probability of making a transition from wage-earning to
self-employment as a function of a set of conditioning variables and EMPPLAN, the
dichotomous variable indicating the presence of an employer-provided health insurance plan
in 1984P The idea was to see if the suggestive negative relationship between EMPPLAN
-14-and the probability of making a transition from Table 4.1 continued to hold in a multivariate
framework. The results, reported in column (1) of Table 5.1 indicate that a negative and
statistically significant impact is present —thecoefficient on EMPPLAN aceeds its standard
error by a factor of more than four. However, as stressed above, the fact the EMPPLAN is
a significant deterniintntoftransitions to self-employment may not be telling us veiy much
about the importance of health insurance portability. Therefore, along the lines suggested in
Section 3 above, we augment this equation with the following variables: SPLAN (=1if the
individual's spouse had family insurance coverage), and SPLAN*EMPPLAN (the interaction
of SPLAN and EMPPLAN)?3 The coefficient ou the interaction term is the differences-in-
differences estimator —itindicates whether the presence of a spouse with a health insurance
plan has a differential impact that depends on the individual's own insurance status. If health
insurance affects transitions, then the incremental effect of being covered on a spouse's plan
should be to generate a greater probability of making a transition for an individual with an
employer-provided plan than for an individual without such a plan. Thus, the interaction
tenn should have a positive coefficient.
The results are presented in column (2) of Table 5.1. The addition of SPLAN and its
interaction with EMPPLAN barely changes any of the other coefficients from their values in
column (1). The key observation, however, is that the coefficient on the interaction term is
statistically.insignificant at conventional levels. Thus, using the differences-in-differences
approach, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the absence of health insurance
portability does not affect transitions into entrepreneurship.
The specifications in columns (1) and (2) implicitly embody the assumption that the
processes governing transitions from wage-earning to self-employment are the same for those
-15-with and without an employer plan. To the extent that the processes differ, the estimates in
column (2) —includingthe estimate on the interaction term —maybe inconsistent. We
therefore divided the sample on the basis of the value of EMPPLAN, estimated separate
logits for the two subsamples, and tested the hypothesis that all of the slope coefficients were
equal across the subsamples. The results for the individuals with EMPPL.AN =0are in
column (3), and those for EMPPLAN =1are in column (4). The chi-square test statistic
was 54, while the critical level at the 0.01levelis 52.2. Hence, we can reject the hypothesis
that the same process generates transitions for those with and without employer-provided
plans.
The fact that it is inappropriate to pool individuals with and without employer-
provided plans suggests that we should try to develop a differences-in-differences estimator
that may be applied to the two groups separately. Our approach is to look only at those with
employer provided plans, who are the individuals of interest in this context. We generate a
differences-in-differences estimator through co-variation in expected health care costs and
spousal insurance coverage within this group. To illustrate this approach, suppose we
augment the regression from column (4) of Table 5.1 with the following variables: SPLAN
(=1if the individual's spouse has family insurance coverage), BED (=numberof days that
the individual and the spouse were bedridden due to illness during the last 4 months), and
SPLAN *BED(the interaction of these variables). If health insurance portability is an
important phenomenon, then individuals whose spouses have insurance that coven them
should be more likely to make a transition, because givingup their current plan imposes a
smaller cost. Moreover, to the extent that BED is a good measure of expected future health
care costs, then the incremental effect of SPLAN on the probability of a transition should
-16-increase with BED —higherexpected health costs make the spouse's insurance a more
important component of the decision. Put differently, a person with very low expected
health costs may not care much one way or the other if he or she would be covered by the
spouse's plan. The coefficient on the interaction term is thus analogous to flinequation
(2), and is the differences-in differences-estimator of health insurance portability effects. If
such effects are present, it should be positive.
The results of this experiment are reported in column (5) of Table 5.1. Like the
results in column (2), they areconsistent with the importance of health insurance
portability. The differences-in-differences estimator is again positive (0.007). but the
associated t-statistic is less than one. The coefficient on SPLAN, while positive, exceeds its
standard error by only a factor of 1.6 —eventhe simple "differences' estimator is
insignificant. Moreover. BED, SPLAN, and their interaction are jointly insignificant —the
associated F(3 ,S 173)-statistic is 1.87, which is significant only at the 0.13 level.
One could argue that the failure for insurance portability to emerge as a significant
phenomenon is that BED is not a very good proxy for exnected health costs. For example.
an individual may have spent quite a bit of time sick at home, but these spells might not have
been associated with substantial medical costs (a bout with the flu comes to mind). Or,
whatever illness that occurred in the past may not be expected to recur in the future. As
Table 4.1 illustrated, we have at our disposal a number of alternative proxies for expected
future health costs. To detennine whether the results in column (5) of Table 5.1 are robust,
we rn-estimate the equation several times, each time replacing BED with a different proxy
for expected health care costs. Specifically, we estimate the equation replacing BED with:
-17-NIJMCOV (the number of people in the family covered by the employer- provided
plan),
CHILDDIS (=Iif there is a child under 18 in the family who is mentally or
physically disabled).
000DHLTH (=1if the person reports him- or herself as being in excellent or good
health),
NTSI2 (number of nights in the last 12 months that the individual or spouse spent in
the hospital),
NTS4 (defined analogously for last 4 months),
DOCI2 (number of doctor visits by individual and spouse in last 12 months),
DOC4 (defined analogously for last 4 months),
EXP12 (medical expenditures associated with individual's and spouse's nights in the
hospital during the past 12 months),24
EXP4 (defined analogously for last 4 months),
NEWCHILD (number of babies in the family born between waves 3 and 9), and
PREDEXP (an index of predicted future health expenditures, based on data from the
National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey.f
Each of these variables in some way proxies for expected health care costs; or
alternatively, for the value that the worker puts upon his or her employer-provided plan,
ceterisparibus. Weexpect families with more members (NUMCOV) or families with
potential health problems (C}ULDDIS and the negative of GOODHLTH) to put a higher
value on insurance. To the extent that people form theft expectations about future health
care use andexpenseson the basis of their recent past experiences, it is appropriate to
-18-examine NTS12, NTS4, DOC12, DOC4, EXP4, and EXP12.26 To the extent that new
babies and the associated medical expenses are anticipated, NEWCHILD should also serve as
a proxy for expected health care costs.27 PREDEXP represents a more explicit attempt to
estimate future health care costs, because it is based on the relationship between an
individual's characteristics and future health care costs.
To conserve space, we report in Table 5.2 only the three coefficients from each
regression that are our main focus —SPLAN,the particular measure of expected health
insurance costs from the list above, and the interaction of the two variables. We also report
the significance level (p) for the joint test that all three coefficients are equal to zero.
For the most part, these experiments confirm the results in column (5)ofTable 5.1 —
onecannot reject the hypothesis that insurance portability effects are absent. The two
exceptions are NTS4 (number of nights spent in the hospital in the past 4 months) and EXP4
(the estimated cost associated with hospital stays and doctor visits in the last 4 months).
What are we to make of these findings? One possibility is that the significance of NTS4 and
EXP4 is a statistical fluke. After all, if one tries enough proxies for a certain variable,
sooner or later one will find a significant result. Alternatively, perhaps the reason that NTS4
and EXPS4 "work" is that they really are superior measures of expected future health costs.
This would be consistent with a "theory" which says that individuals form their expectations
about future health costs as some function of their very recent health costs.
At least for the moment, let us assume that the significance of NTS4 and EXPS4 is
not merely a statistical fluke, and examine the quantitative significance of NTS4. To begin,
one should note that only 4 percent of the sample had y nights in the hospital in the last
four months. Thus, for 96 percent of our sample, this variable is zero, and there is no effect
-19-at all on transition probabilities. To determine the effect of alternative coverage, we
compute for each person their estimated probability of making a transition (on the basis of
the logit estimates), and compare it to the probability if each person had alternative coverage.
The latter probability is computed by setting each right-hand side variable to its actual
value, except that in the interaction term SPLAN*NTS4. SPLAN is set equal to 1 for
everyone. We fmd that the transition probability increases from 2.086 percent to 1178
percent, or 0.092 percentage points. This is not a substantial increase.
It is also helpful to interpret the results using our differences-in-differences
framework. To do this, we consider the effect of alternative coverage on the transition
probabilities of those with one night in the hospital in the last four months, Specifically, we
compute the transition probabilities for the sample four times, each time using one of the
four combinations of spouse plan or no spouse plan and 0 or 1 nights in the hospital. The




The difference-in-difference estimator is 0.23 percentage points, that is, the transition
probability of those who had a night in the hospital but no alternative coverage would be
0.23 percentage points greater if alternativecoverage were available. However, since less




Four Monthsand many of these already had spousal coverage, the effect on the overall transition rate into
self-employment is slight.
In summaly, support for the hypothesis that insurance portability affects transitions to
entrepreneurship appears weak at best. When we use a conventional differences-in-
differences approach that pools individuals with and without employer-provided plans, we
find no effect. When we use an alternative estimator that relies on differences in expected
health care costs among those who have employer-provided plans, no statistically discernable
effect is present for most of our measures of expected health care costs. For the one
measure where it is present, the quantitative significance is slight, except perhaps for a very
small segment of the population. Perhaps it is the experience of this small segment which
accounts for the anecdotal evidence that lack of health insurance is an impediment to
becoming an entrepreneur.
Alternative Soecifications. In virtually any regression model, various control
variables can be challenged on the basis that they are really endogenous. One can imagine.
for example, that people choose a particular occupation as a wage earner because it will
facilitate a future transition to entrepreneurship. While we do not think that we have too
many problems in this respect, it is nonetheless useful to determine whether the various
triples of variables presentedin Table 5.2 are significant when they are entered into the
equation without ?flY other controls. If so, we need to investigate the endogeneity issue more
carefully. If not, the issue is moot. The results are reported in Table 5.3. They indicate
that the absence of the control variables does not have much effect on our substantive results
—theonly difference is that NTS4 and EXY4 are also statistically insignificant. Thus, even
-21-if some of the controls may be suspect because of endogeneity, this does not appear to be
driving our results.
Another possible objection to the analysis is the heterogeneous nature of the sample,
which includes men, women, blacks, whites, singles and marrieds. It could be that the
processes governing the transition into entrepreneurship are different for various groups, and
pooling them together obscures the effects of health insurance portability. We therefore re-
estimated the model of Table 5.1 using the following sub-samples: males, white males,
white married males, individuals who usually work full time (more than 35 hours per week)
in both periods, males who usually work full time in both periods, individuals who are not
looking for a job or on layoff during the sample period, and married males who usually work
full time.28 In effect, this gives us nine sets of results like those in Table 5.2.29 To
conserve space, we do not include those nine tables here. What the results show is that the
findings in Table 5.2 are quite robust with respect to the choice of sample. Generally, with
the exception of the NTS4 and EXP4 variables, there is no evidence for health insurance
portability effects.30' 31
Anotherissue relates to the length of transition period. Our analyses thus far look at
the period 1984 to 1986. One can argue that portability effects might be more likely to be
present during a shorter transition period. To see why, imagine an earner, currently covered
by an employer-provided plan, who unexpectedly suffers a deterioration in his health, leading
to an unexpected increase in his future health costs. To the extent that it is difficult for the
employer to make rapid changes in the individual's wages, then the value of his employment
packageincreasesin the short run —hisinsurance is worth more to him, while his wages
have not fallen. Thus, the inducement to stay at the current job is relatively large. Over a
-22-longer period, however, the employer can reduce the individual's wages (or some other
component of the employment package) to bring the value of the package into line with its
value before the shock occurred. If so. the inducement to stay will disappear. Thus,
according to this story, insurance portability effects might be more pronounced over a shorter
time period.
We therefore re-estimated the models in Table 5.2 using one-year transitions. An
advantage of using one-year transitions is that it permits us to incorporate into the analysis
additional observations, giving us more employment to self-employment changes with which
to identify potential portability effects. Specifically, we pooled data for transitions from
1984 to 1985 with data, for transitions from 1986 to 1987.32 The resulting sample includes
13,247 people, about 50 percent more observations than those used to compute the estimates
in Table 5.2. Using these data changed none of the results in Table 5.2 —thereis no
evidence of portability effects.
The Role of State Laws. As noted in Section 3 above, during our sample period a
number of states had laws which mandated that when an employee left a firm for any reason
other than gross misconduct, he or she had to be given the option to purchase health
insurance from the firm for some length of time. Although the specific provisions varied
from state to state, generally the employee was supposed to be charged 100percentof the
premium paid on the employee's behalf by the firm, and the period of time was three to
twelve months, depending on the state. To the extent that insurance portability effects are
present, we would expect individuals in states with mandates to have higher probabilities of
making a transition to self-employment, cererisparibus. Thus,along the lines suggested
above, we test for portability effects by augmenting the basic equation in column (5) of
-23-Table 5.1 with the variables SPLAN and MAND84, where MAND84 is a dichotomous
variable equal to one if the individual's state had a mandate in place in 1984, and zero
otherwise.
The results are presented in the first column of the top panel of Table 5.4. The
coefficient on MANDS4 is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that workers who
live in states with health insurance mandates are no more likely to become self-employed
than individuals who do not. However, this specification may ignore an important aspect of
mandates. It might not be the presence of a mandate perSe, butrather the number of
months of coverage provided by the mandate that affects transitions to entrepreneurship. We
therefore created the variable M0S84, equal to the number of months of coverage mandated
by the individual's state. We then augmented the basic equation with SPLAN and M0S84.
The results are in the second panel of Table 5.4. Again, the mandate variable is statistically
insignificant.
Of the mandates in effect in 1984, some had been recently enacted, while others had
existed for a number of years. It is possible that there are lags between the time a law
mandating benefits for former employees is passed and the time when finns and employees
become fully aware of the law and comply with it.33 If such is the case, then the
specification in column (1) of the rust panel in Table 5.4 may be incorrect. To investigate
this possibility we created the variables MAND83 and MAND82, dichotomous variables for
the presence of a mandate law in 1983 and 1982, respectively. Similarly, in analogy to
MOSS4, we created M0583 and M0S82 for the number of months for which coverage was
mandated in 1983 and 1982. respectively. The results using MA14D83 and MAND82are in
the second and third columns of the first panel, respectively; those for M0S83 and M0S82
-24-are in the second panel. The mandate variablescontinuetobestatistically insignificant.
Thus,theresults in column (1) of the table are not a consequence of lags in compliance with
mandate laws.
Apotentialproblem with these resultsisthat states whose residents have high
transition propensities might be more likelytoenact mandates, ceterisparibws. Inthat case,
the coefficientonthe respectivemandatevariables might not be telling us anything aboutthe
effectsof healthinsurance portability.M To deal with this possibility,we adoptthe now
familiar strategy of interacting the mandate variables with SPLAN. The test of the
importance of mandates then becomes whether thc interaction term is significant and negative
—inthe presence of a mandate, presumably the incremental benefit of the spouse having a
plan is less.
The results are reported in the bottom two panels of Table 5.4. In all cases, the
interaction tenns have the wrong sign and are insignificant. Once again, health insurance
portability effects appear to be absent.
5.2Resultsfrom the P510
We conduct our analysis of the data from the PSID in parallel to that of the SIPP data
reported above. We begin by analyzing a sample of individuals who were wage and salary
workers in 1984; excluding those in agriculture, those who worked under five hours per
week on average,, and those younger than 16 or older than 62. We then estimate a logit
model in which the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual made the transition to
entrepreneurship in the 1986 wave of the PSID. and zero otherwise.
Column (1) of Table 5.5reportsthe parameter estimates of a specification that mimics
the SIPP specification as closely as possible. The key variable of interest, EMPPLAN. has a
-25-negative coefficient. This is another example of the empirical regularity that those with
employer-provided insurance are less likely to move into entrepreneunhip.
An advantage of the PSI]) is that it has more information on fringe benefits than the
SIPP. Thus, we have more observableindicationsof "good jobs" versus "bad jobs." We
conjectured earlier that the EMPPLAN variable might simply be a proxy for a "good job."
If this conjecture were correct, then the inclusion of additional job quality variables should
reduce the importance of EMPPLAN. Column (2) shows the results when these variables —
LIFEINS,DENTAL, and PENSION (defined in Table 4.3) —areincluded. The coefficient
on EMPPLAN falls in magnitude, and is no longer statistically significant, a fmding that
confirms the notion that looking at EMPPLAN alone is not a suitable strategy for
investigating job-lock.
As before, we examine several differences-in-differences estimators. In column (3)
we present the first one, which augments the basic specification with SPLAN and the
interaction of SPLAN with EMPPLAN. As the table shows, the estimated coefficient is
incorrectly signed from a job-lock perspective. Moreover, it is statistically insignificant.
As in the SIPP, one can reject the hypothesis that the transition processes of those
with and those without employer-provided plans are the same.35 As before, we focus on
the sample of individuals with employer-provided insurance. Recall from above that among
these individuals, the ones with more nights in the hospital, and presumably greater expected
costs, will put a greater value on insurance provided by a spouse. Hence, if job-lock is an
important consideration, one would expect the coefficient on the interaction between the
spouse plan variable and number of nights in the hospital to be positive. However, as shown
-26-in column (4) of Table 5.5, although the point estimate is positive, it is statistically
insignificant.
One could argue that the failure for insurance portability to emerge as a significant
phenomenon is that NIGHTS is not a very good proxy for extected health costs. As
discussed earlier, the PSI]) provides alternative proxies for expected future health costs.
Thus, to determine whether the results in column (4) of Table 5.5 are sensitive to the choice
of variables, we re-estimate the equation several times, each time replacing NIGHTS with a
different proxy for expected health care costs. Specifically, we use the variables:
000DHLTH (=1if the person reports him- or herself as being in excellent or good
health).
WORSEHLTH (=1if the person reports him- or herself as being in worse health
than two years previously), and
HLOST (number of hours of work lost due to illness of the individual and his or her
spouse).
We conserve space by reporting in the left column of Table 5.6onlythe three
coefficients from each logit that are our main focus —SPLAN,the variable measuring
expected health insurance costs, and the interaction of the two variables. We also report the
significance level (p) for the joint test that all three coefficients are equal to zero. In each
case, these experiments confirm the results Table 5.5. One cannot reject the hypothesis of
rio job-lock.
Also shown in Table 5.6 (right column) are the results of estimating our transition
equations using gjfly the three variables of interest (and a constant). As noted earlier,
omitting the other covariates provides a rough check of the influence of endogeneity on our
-27-results. Comparing the two panels indicates little reason for concern; the only noticeable
change is the greater significance of GOODHLTH in the right panel.
Finally, we examined whether our results are the artifact of a highly heterogeneous
sample by conducting separate analyses for: males, white males, white man-ied males,
individuals who usually work full time (more than 35 hours per week), males who usually
work full time, and married males who usually work full time. The results uniformly
indicate that the rmdthgs in Tables 5.5 and 5.6arequite robust with respect to the choice of
sample. Similarly, we investigated whether the results are sensitive to the length of the
transition period by repeating our analyses of the PSID using transitions between 1984 and
1985, instead of the longer period 1984 to 1986. Again, the qualitative nature of our results
is unchanged.
In summary, the PSID provides no more support for the hypothesis that insurance
portability reduces transitions to entrepreneurship than does the SIPP. A conventional
differences-in-differences approach that pools individuals with and without employer-provided
plans indicates no effect. Also, alternative estimates that rely on variations in expected
health care costs among those who have employer-provided plans show no statistically
significant effect.
6. CONCLUSION
In the current debate over the U.S. health care system, one of the most important
issues is the effect of the system on labor market outcomes. In particular, because most
individuals receive their insurance as part of their employment packages, and this insurance
is generally not portable, there have been fears that the system locks people into their current
-28-jobs, reducing mobility in the labor market. The focus of this paper is on one important
type of labor market transition that might be impeded by the lack of health insurance
portability —themovement from wage-earning to self-employment.
Our empirical strategy is guided by a very simple idea. If one looks at a wage earner
who has employer-provided health insurance, then the greater the cost to the worker of losing
that insurance, the less likely he or she is to become self-employed, ceterisparibics.Thus.
for example, people with higher expected health costs should be less likely to give up their
current jobs to strike out on their own. We used this framework to analyze the decisions
made by individuals in two panel data sets, The Survey of Income and Program
Participation, and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Except for a very small segment of
the population, we were able to find no evidence for this phenomenon in either data set. We
also examined the impact of state mandates requiring that, when an employee leaves a finn.
he or she has to be given the option to purchase health insurance from the finn for some
length of time. Again, we found no evidence that the presence of such laws affects
transitions to self-employment. In short, contrary to the anecdotal evidence and the
assertions of some policymakers, the lack of health insurance portability does not appear to
affect the propensity to leave wage employment and strike out on one's own. Whatever its
other merits, there is no reason to believe that the introduction of universal health insurance
would significantly enhance entrepreneurial activity.
Is this result plausible? Two considerations are relevant here. First, as noted above,
even in the literature on job-to-job transitions, there is considerable ambiguity about the
importance of job-lock. Second, by its very nature, the transition to entrepreneurship is very
risky. A survey by the National Federation of Independent Business found a new business
-29-failure rate of 15 percent after three years; the Small Business Administration found an even
higher failure rate: 23.7 percent after two years, 51.7 percent after four years and 62.7
percent after six years (Johnson (1991]). Perhaps it should not be surprising that individuals
who are willing to undertake such risky ventures are unimpeded by the prospect of not
having health insurance.
-30-Endnotes
1. Robin Toner, "Promising Peace of Mind," New York Times, September 23, 1993,
p.A1.
2. Recent legislative developments have enhanced the portability of insurance. We
return to these developments below.
3. Daily Labor Repon, October 7, 1993.
4. To the extent term-of-service limitations are present, the loss of insurance may only
be temporary.
5. According to one survey, about 57 percent of employers' policies contain exclusions
for pre-existing conditions. See A. Foster Higgins & Co., Inc. [1987].
6. In fact, for the 1992 tax year, even this exclusion was permitted to lapse. Special
legislation passed in 1993 made the self-employed retroactively eligible for the
deduction if they file an amended return.
7. See United States General Accounting Office [1992].
8. See Bureau of National Affairs Pension Reporter [1993, p.858].
9. Although the costs of making a transition to entrepreneurship exceed the costs of a
job-to-job transition, the existence of conventional job-lock does not imply the
existence of an effect on transitions to entrepreneurship, because the decision to
become an entrepreneur may be fundamentally different from the decision to take
another job.
10.One may think of this relationship as having been generated by an underlying process
in which the individual compares the expected utilities associated with wage-earning
and entrepreneurship. See Evans and Jovanovic [1989] or Holtz-Ealcin, Joulfaian, and
Rosen [1994].
11.Such a "difference within differences" approach is used by Gruber and Poterba [1993]
to estimate the demand for health insurance.
12.Each wave of the SIPP corresponds to a four month reference period. Wave 3 of the
1984 panel is of particular interest because it included a special "topical module" that
included health and health care utilization data. For a general discussion of the
structure of the SIPP data, see United States Depariment of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census [1987].
13.In addition, we drop observations if the individual is not in the sample during the
entire wave, if the individual cannot be matched with his or her spouse, etc.
14.About 20 percent of the self-employed also reported wage and salary income.
15.This is similar to Gruber and Poterba's [1993] finding that in the Current Population
Survey data for the years 1986-1990, the percentage of self-employed individuals with
insurance coverage was nine points below the percentage for employed individuals.
- -31-16.This result continues to hold when different subsamplesareexamined. When we
restricted the sample to married males only, the raw difference in the propensity to be
uninsured was 9.1 percentage points; the regression corrected difference was 9.6
percentage points.
17.The number of wage and salary earners represented in columns (3) and (4) of Table
4.1 is less than that in column 1 because of the inability to match some individuals in
waves 3 and 9. Some of the attrition is due to the fact that, in response to budgetary
problems, the sample was randomly reduced by 17.8 percent from wave 3 to wave 5.
(See Herriot and Kasprzyk [1986].) To determine whether there was any
nonrandomness in the sample used for the transition analysis, we estimated a
regression in which the left-hand side variable equalled one if there was a match in
wave 9 and zero otherwise, and the right-hand side variables included most of the set
in Table 4. We found that while the probability of attrition was significantly related
to several right-hand side variables (e.g., the owner-occupied housing variable), the
quantitative effects were rather small.
18.As will be seen below, the job tenure variable consistently shows up as a significant
determinant of the probability of making a transition from wage-earning to self-
employment. The NMES data used by Cooper and Monheit [forthcoming] and
Madrian [1992] to investigate job-to-job transitions do not include years on the current
job.
19.Similarly, the transition rate for individuals whose spouses are covered (0.0335, s.d. =0.180)is significantly greater than those whose spouses are not covered
(0.0219, s.d. =0.147).
20.In the SlIP data, the individual is explicitly asked if he or she is covered under the
spouse's plan. No such question is present in the PSID.
21.However, in contrast to the current COBRA law, firms with fewer than 20 employees
were typically covered by the state mandates.
22.More precisely, EMPPLAN indicates whether there was an employer-provided plan
any time during wave 3. We also constructed a variable that indicated whether there
was an employer-provided plan during the last month of wave 3. The two variables
led to essentially the same substantive results.
23.Alternatively, one could define SPLAN in terms of whether the spouse had any
insurance coverage (as opposed to family coverage). When we re-estimated our basic
specification using this definition, the results were substantially the same as those
reported below.
24.The expenditure indices were generated by summing the estimated hospitalexpenses —theavenge cost of a night in the hospital in the individual's state in 1984 times the
number of nights spent —andthe estimated physician expenses —anationwide
avenge physician visit charge times the number of doctor visits. The hospital costs
were obtained from the &atistical Abstract 0/the United States 1987(1986], and the
physician charge data were obtained from the Source Book of Health insurance Data,
1984-1985.
25.To formulate this index, one uses the NMCUES data to estimate a regression of total
health expenses in a given year on variables observed at the beginning of theyear.
The regression included only the insured individuals, although the substantive results
-32-are unchangedwhen the entire sample is used. The regressors include the health
status and demographicvariables that arccommon to both data sets: The results from
this regression are used toimputeavalue ofexpectedhealthcareexpenditures for
eachindividual in the SIPP data. For funkier details, see Penrod [1993].
26.Note, however, that according to Eliwood and Adam [1990, p. 126], past medical
expenditures explain vexy little of the variance in current medical expenditures.
27.This is similar to Madrian's [1992] use of a pregnancy variable in her analysis of job-
to-job transitions.
28.The married group is restricted to those with stable marriages over the relevant time
period.
29.The set of control variables changes slightly as we move from sample to sample. For
example, it makes no sense to control for race in a regression using a sample that is
exclusively white.
30.Another possible issue is that some people in the sample may receive portable
insurance from their union; our data give us no direct information on this
phenomenon. In one experiment, we excluded from the sample those individuals who
were employed in the trucking and construction industries, reasoning that they were
the most likely to have such coverage. Their exclusion did not affect our main
results.
31.In the subsample consisting only of individuals who were never looking for a job or on
layoff during the sample period, DOC4 is significant at the 0.03 level. However, the
quantitative effect is rather small—a simulation of the kind discussed above suggests an
increase in the transition probability of 0.0035 for this part of the population.
32.The 1986 to 1987 transitions are from the 1986 SIPP panel, a shorter panel that was
not of use for the earlier analysis. This set of equations omits the job tenure variable
since it is not available in the 1986 SIPP panel. Due to small cell sizes, models using
child disability could not be estimated.
33.Thus, for example, Flynn [1992] finds that the take-up rate of the federal COBRA
increased from 11.2 percent in 1989 to 20.5 percent in 1991. although the increase
was not monotonic.
34.This point is made by Gruber and Madrian [1993].
35.The p-value is 0.009.
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-35-TABLE 4.1
Mesasha the SW? Da&
CI) (2) (3) (4)
Wa8e.Easnen Sm-Employed Remain Transition to
VARIABLE Wave 3 ha Wave 3 Wage.Earnen Enurpreoeursbip
Economic and Demotrnahic
VLjables
AGE 35.3 41.5 35.6 35.3
(12.3) (11.1) (11.9) (10.6)
EDIJC (Years of Education) 12.3 13.3 12.9 13.7
(2.74) (2.98) (2.73) (2.67)
BLACK (—1. if black) 0.0972 0.0356 0.0363 0.0236
(0.296) (0.185) (0.281) (0.152)
SPOUSEw (—1, If spouse 0.619 0.559 0.618 0.636
woebfulldine) (0.486) (0.497) (0.436) (0.482)
KIDNIJM (utumber of children 0.638 0.937 0.676 0.804
er 18) (1.03) (1.18) (1.0$) (1.05)
METRO(—I.Iflives In 0.750 0.684 0.744 0.713
meanpolitanana) (0.433) (0.465) (0.436) (0.453)
UNION (—I, If union 0.204 0.00770 0.212 0.0946
membership or would) (0.403) (0.0874) (0.409) (0.293)
EARNINGS (earned income) 5,333 6,177 5,663 6.530
(4.308) (3.048) (4,237) (5,614)
HOURS (usual hours of work 38.4 42.9 38.9 40.2
pa week) (11.2) (17.7) (10.7) (12.5)
FAMING(familyIncome) 3.000 4.280 3,100 3.710
(4,610) (6,030) (4,540) (4,770)
REG2(—1,11 Midwest) 0.223 0.234 0.277 0.250
(0.416) (0.424) (0.447) (0.434)
REG3 (—I, If South) 0.261 0.353 0.318 0.345
(0.439) (0.478) (0.466) (0.416)
REG4 (—I, if West) 0.327 0.217 0.182 0.230
(0.469) (0.412) (0.386) (0.421)
0CC! (—1,1? manufacturing) 0.216 0.331 0.232 0.294
(0.411) (0.471) (0.422) (0.456)
0CC (—I. iftechnica], sales, 0.318 0.300 0.320 0.331
adminIstration) (0.466) (0.458) (0.467) (0.471)TABLE 4.1 (continued)
Means In tbe Sn'? Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage-Earnen Self-Employed Remain Transition to
Wave 3 io Wave 3 Wage-Earners EntrepTeacunhip
OCC3 (=1. ifservice) 0.149 0.131 0.133 0.111
(0.356) (0.337) (0.339) (0.315)
OCC4 (—I,ifaaft.repair) 0198 0.0707 0.12! 0.349
(0.399) (0.256) (0.326) (0.356)
OCC5 (—I.if operator,LabOrer) 0.198 0.0707 0.194 0.115
(0.398) (0.256) (0.396) (0.319)
MANUF (—1.11inmanufacturing 0.235 0.0486 0.251 0.172
indusny) (0.424) (0.215) (0.434) (0.378)
HOME (—1.ifadividualor spouse .0.518 0.75! 0.552 0.58!
owns borne) (0.500) (0.433) (0.497) (0.494)
TflJURE(numberofyearsonmain 6.75 9.16 7.07 5.00 j) (7.75) (9.15) (7.67) (6.83)
CHILD (own children under 18) 0.637 0.937 0.676 0.804
(2.03) (1.18) (1.05) (1.05)
XIDAGE< I (number of children less 0.0382 0.0337 0.0396 0.0507
than!) (0.193) (0.180) (0.397) (0.220)
KIDAGEI-2 (ounerofc1dIdrea 0.0826 0.101 0.0835 0.329
between ages I and 2 (0.288) (0.319) (0.288) (0.374)
X1DAGE3.5 (nutnbaofchildxtn 0.121 0.164 0.129 0.319
between ages 3 and 5) (0.366) (0.426) (0.371) (0.40!)
FEMALE (—I. If female) 0.470 0.339 0.457 0.348
(0.499) (0.473) (0.498) (0.477)
MARRIED (—1. If tnanied and spouse 0398 0.798 0.628 0.743
ptaaJt) (0.490) (0.40!) (0.483) (0.438)
PREVMAR (=1.1! previously married, 0.132 0.109 0.124 0.0878
but not currently marrIed) (0.338) (0.312) (0.330) (0.284)
DIVORCE(—!. if divorced or 0.0348 0.0309 0.0348 0.0543
aeparated between waves) and 9) (0.183) (0.173) (0.183) (0.227)
NEWCHILD (—I. if child born between .0.0885 0.0790 0.0809 0.0946
wives 3 and 9) (0.295) (0.282) (0.282) (0.304)
WED (—I. if got married between 0.0563 0.0371 0.0548 0.0709
waves 3 and 9) (0.231) (0.189) (0.228) (0.257)TABLE 4.1 (contInued)














Health and Insmne Variable


























































000D}ILTH (—I. If self-reported bealth















































































N 19391 2.078 11,697 296
$ Means ale than from wave 3 of the 19*4 panel. The sample In cotnum (I) Is .11 IndivIduals who west wage-nn in
wave 3. The sample In column (2) Is all Individuals who were self-employed In wave 3. The colunm (3) sample Is
Individuals who ne wage-camel in wave 3 and tumalned wage-camera in waVe 9. The cot (4) sale Is Individuals
who ware w.gc-arrars in wave 3 ad self-employed In wave 9. flgurc In parentheses art standard deviation.
Man onodidonal en the individual being antis with spouse present
Sum of ined Income of IndIvidual and spouse pins the nS Income of the spouse.
4Method of cainjiadon explained In text. Due to missing Information, this variable could cot be consuucted for 7 pa of
the sample.TABLE 4.2
Linear Probabllfty Modc of R&th Insunnce SIstrn
VARIABLE VARIABLE (conCd)
SELF 0.0883 OCC5 0.04870
(0.00717) (0.007805)
AGE 0.01035 MANUF .0.06238
(0.00137) (0.005423)
AGE2 .0.0001273 HOME .0.07029
(0.000017) (0.005473)
EDUC .0.008861 TENURE .0.002553
(0.000906) (0.3306)
BLACK 0.03278 CHILD 0.003307
(0.007235) (0.01084)
SPOUSEWK -0.04202 KIDAGEI-2 0.01032
(0.006436) (0.007473)
IUDNUM 0.002559 KIDAGE3-5 .0.006236
(0.002545) (0.006139)
METRO .0.ó1236 FEMALE -0.02634
(0.004754) (0.005062)
UNION -0.07652 MARRIED 4.001381
(0.005614) (0.008300)
EARNINGSxIO4 -5.67 PREVMAR 0.02122
(0.565) (0.008255)




R102 0.02318 •Dq.a'_daitvariableequals one if the Individual was
(0.005856) coveredbynohealth innnnce plant all in Wave 3 of the
SIPP. and oth&wise. SELF - 1 if the individualwas
REG3 °()
self-employed, andwootherwise. Other variables art









Mans S thersm D.te
EMPL&N (a I, if employer-ptovided insuxncc) 0.688
(0.463)
SPISN(at•if spouse employet-pTovided insunoce) 0.355
(0.4783






EDUC (yen, of education) 12.6
(2.40)
FEMALE Ni. if female) 0.449
(0.497)
BLACK (—1, ilbIrk) 0.3)4
(0.464)
MARRIED (a I. if cnarncd and spouse present) 0.752
(0.432)
HOME(—I. if bomeower) 0.613
(0.487)
KIDNUM (number of childrea under IS) 1.12
(1.19)
KIDAGEO-2(aI. if childaged 0-2) 0.179
(0.383)
KIDAGE3-5 (I Ifchildaged3-5) 0.193
(0.395)
REG2(—I. If Notth Central) 0.222
(0.420)
REG3(I if South) 0.446
(0497)
RE04 (—1,11 West) 0.151
(0.358)




Mean, is the PSID Data
0CC(CI. if pmfessional) 0.286
(0.45 2)
0CC (1. ifnles) 0.214
(0.4 10)
OCC4 (1. if blue-collar) 0343
(0.475)
UNION (-1. if union membership or contract) 0.201
(0.400)
MANUP (—I. if manufacturing) 0.250
(0.433)
LN(EARN) (logofearnedincomein 1984) 9.52
(0.839)
LNOIOUPS) (los of bows in 1984) 7.54
(0.357)
FAMINC(family incomein 1984) 35.369
(Th,912)
SHOURS(spouse hours in 1984) 1154
(1,048)
TENURE (months with current employer, 1984) 87.4
(87.6)
LIFEINS (= I. if employer life insurance) 0.564
(0.496)
DENTAL(—1.ii emploverdetual plan) 0,447
(0.497)
PENSION (—1.11 pension plan) 0534
(0,499)
NIGHTS (nights in hospital, self and spouse, 1984) 8.72
(13.4)
NIGHTS x SPLAN 5.50
(11.5)







000DKLTh x SPLAN 0.238
(0.426)





Means are taken from the1984 wave of the PSID. Figmesin parembeses nitscandard
&vkns.Table 5.!
LogftAnalysis of Tr,nsttons (ruin Wage Earnings to Entreprtneunhlps

































































































































































































LogitAnalyses ofTransitionsfrom Wage Earnings to EotrtpnneonhiW
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
REG3 0.2061 0.2)65 0.5066 0.02802 03532
(0.1779) (0.1783) (0.2935) (0.2269) (02273)
REG4 0.3335 0.3415 0.6539 0.1537 0.1552
(0.1894) (0.1897) (0.3068) (0.2470) (02473)
0CC 0.1209 0.1172 0.3863 .0.04114 .0.04893
(0.1674) (0.1676) (0.2846) (0.2119) (0.2122)
OCC3 0.03274 0.03309 0.3806 -0.1940 0.2065
(0.2441) (0.2443) (0.3500) (0.3719) (0.372!)
OCC4 0.2282 0.2237 0.9274 .0.2805 -0.2932
(0.2262) (0.2265) (0.3669) (0.3030) (0.3031)
0CC .0.2768 .0.2829 .0.1905 .03629 .0.3902
(0.2469) (0.2474) (0.4129) (0.3173) (0.3182)
MANUP .0.2803 .0.2848 .0.2663 .0.2967 -0.3020
(0.258!) (0.1682) (0.3534) (0.1948) (0.1947)
HOUSE .0.07522 .0.09024 .0.07979 .0.02731 .0.04233
(0.1526) (0.1537) (0.238!) (0.2023) (0.2021)
TENURE .0.05297 .0.05225 .0.08423 .0.04496 .0.04426
(0.01222) (0.01213) (0.02768) (0.01376) (0.01377)
DIVORCE 0.1743 0.2756 0.1277 0.1923 0.1902
(0.2750) (0.275!) (0.4250) (0.3661) (0.3661)
WED 0.5976 0.5999 0.6946 0.481) 0.4833
(0.2576) (0.2577) (0.3842) (0.3532) (0.3534)
NEWCHILD .0.2020 .0.234! .0.4706 4.06576 .0.06606
(0.2142) (0.2143) (0.3546) (0.2727) (0.2723)
IUDAGE<1 . 0.04592 0.02810 0)049 0.04746 0.01147
(0.2823) (0.2827) (0.4542) (0.3665) (0.3684)
KIDAOEI.2 0.33 10 0.3300 -0.02036 .5095 0.5122
(0.2857) (0.1854) (0.3127) (0.2325) (0.2323)
KIDAOE3.5 -0.07574 .0.07366 0.2267 -0.3030 .0.2957
(0.1764) (0A764) (0.2607) (0.2459) (0.2460)
CONSTANT 4.420 .6.406 . .9654 -3.275 .3.320
(1.113) (1.115) (1.578) (2.152) (2.153)
LOGLIKELIHOOD -1296:6 .2295.6 -5045 .774.1 -7723
N 11.995 11.993 3.890 8.103 8.103
to no column, theleft-bandsidevariable I, thelogoftheoddsofmaking annsition fromwage.earningtoself
enioync.The results In columns (I) and (2) mitforthe cite simple. The column (3) result, mtfor thesaç!e of
IndlyWusiswho did not have an eeç,loyer.provided instance plan, and those in columns (4)and (5) nfor individuals
whohadan etnployer.ptovldedpta Figuns In pannthesa are standard cots. Vaflabln sit deAnS in TaMe4.1.Table 5.2





































































p OAR p 0.323 p 0.377
These ate the coefficients irons a sesies of Ingit models in which the left-hand side variable Is the log of the odds of making atransition from wage taming to sell-
employment, and the other right-hand side variables are the some as in column (4)01 Table 5.1. flgures in parentheses are standard errors1 and p isthe signilicassce
level of a Joint test of Use hypothesis that all three coefficients are zero. Variables are drOned in Table 4.1. The sample used to estimatethe equation with PR EDEX P
has about 5 percent fewer observations than the rest of the equations because some of the observations lacked data on family characteristics that were requiredto geitcralc
the predicted espenditure amounts.Table 5.3
AlternatIve Manures of Expected IlSth Care Costs













































































p 0.0393 p 0.488 p 0.576 p 0.0909
These us the coefficients from a aeties of logil models in which the left-hand side variable ia ihe log or the odds or making atransition from wage taming to self-
employment1 and the only other right-hand aide variable Ia a nsiant. Figures in parentheses are standard errors, and p Is the aignifleance level of ajoin; teal of the


































































p 0.0382 p 0.0292 p 0.0416
These wt the coetticians from £ sale of Inca idds In which the le*•band side variable Is the log of she odds of making a
insisidon bum wage earning to se1fcmpIoymem. and the other righl4iand side variables n the same at In column (4) of Table S
MANDS4 - 211 In 1984 the Individuars state S..A that thrma employees be allowed in pwthasc health Insurance, and rert
otherwise; MANDS3 and MANDS2 are defined umlogously for 1983 and 1982. 140584 Is the number of months of connge
mandated by law in 1984; 140583 and 140582 ate defined analogously. Figure m pareathesa are standard axon, and pu the
signilianee level oft joint ted thai the tee coeffidenas ate equal to zero.Table 5.5
Logit Ans1)C of Tnnsltlons from Wage Earning ioEtrepreoeunbip In tbe PSIIY















































































































































RE-OS -10.29 10.29 10.28 -9.998to the PSUY Iogit Analyse of





















































































































LOGLDLIHOOD -591.4 -575.3 .575.2 .318.40
N 4588 1583 4588 3157
• In eath coha the left-haS side variable Is the log oftheodds of making a tnnsition from wage-earning to sell-
cmploymt.The results In column (I). (2). and (3) sin for the aSre sample. The column (4)resultsare forthesample Of
Individualswho hat an cmploytr.ptovldcd lnsanncz plan. Variables are defined In Table 4.3
Table 5.5(contInued)
TrahIoes (root Wage Earning toEctrtprtneunhipTable 5.6












































Column (1) conizios 1hz coefficients from a series of regmessions in which the left-band side variable is the
log oldie odds of making a tnnsidon horn wage-caning to self-cmploymern.. and the other flgbl-bznd side
variables art the in a in colt (4)01Table5.5. The coin (2) results atefromequations with no
additional right-band aide variables other than a cooslnt.